A commentary on Competition Sutra #8

This is an analysis and commentary of the case study posed in the previous post.

For Vikram Monga, the scenario is completely skewed against him. He can’t win. And any victory will be merely pyrrhic( hollow). Plus, the choices shown here reflect only one iteration of moves. But real life is a string of moves – each joining with the next, caused by the previous. While a rational choice suggests to move to the Nash Equilibrium i.e. move towards price cuts and let the game play out. If Sam turns out to be truly wise he will also respond with his cuts. Not cutting will steal his customers, expanding physically to gain them back is suboptimal. Which implies there is only one action left for Sam to respond – price cut of his own.

As a result, a price cut will be matched by a price cut. But lets think from a different perspective. This game can be played once more, and again the same decisions will be taken – price cut matched by a price cut (perhaps this time Sam will cut the price first to force Vik’s hands).

When you set out to dig a grave for someone, dig two.

What looks optimal in short term, may turn disastrous in the long run. Having a long run perspective is perhaps the most important skill for a successful leader. If Vik realises that a price cut will initiate a chain reaction, then he can very well intrapolate that one day the margins left will be as thin as a wet tissue paper. He may walk into the sunset as a gung-ho leader who played a “no-holds-barred” game with his competitors and who knows the business media might celebrate it as well- and yet his successor will none the less be worse off.

A simple thing for Vikram to do is to choose to not to do something. That is- don’t disturb the apple cart, do nothing, choose nothing, let the status quo be maintained et al. However if he must he can try to completely change the nature of the game:

When you can’t win, change the rules

One of the big takeaway from this game is that there are certain rules at play. However real life is varied and different with its own dynamics. Vikram should try to change the rules of the engagement altogether

a. Invent itself as a platform: Can B&M increase the engagement of an average customer with its products and services? Can it make the average customer interact with the existing setup? And in the process can it give some value to her? Think how Target drives its business. It doesn’t see itself as a dispenser of products, it sees itself as a dispenser of retailing experience. That way it can turn the rules of the game on its head by imposing a psychological switching cost on the customers and monetizing it by raising the prices.
b. Niche, Niche, nice! : Can B&M and Jubilant Retail come to an unwritten, tacit understanding with the help of (plenty of) signalling to divide the offerrings completely among themselves? One of them completely focusses on the home and kitchen appliances, while the other stocks it minimally (else regulators will catch hold of them) and focusses completely on entertainment.
c. Loyalty Programs: Airlines do it, so can retail. Vikram should focus on increasing the psychological switching cost for his customers. Cutting price is also a kind of imposing a switching cost on the customer- but it is the feeblest and the weakest cost because anyone else can come in and undercut your price.

Competition Sutra #8: The games companies play


Vikram “Vik” Monga is thinking hard. And if he isn’t, he should be.

For Vik the piece of paper lying in front of his was telling everything he needed to know. And he was right. The situation is messed up- with no avoiding of the blood bath that lay ahead.


52 year old Vik was the CEO of Bentham & Martin – one of the largest retail chains in India and the largest in Eastern India. However for Vik, life wasn’t easy. He had Jubilant Retail snapping up at his heels.

Jubilant Retail was the new kid on the retailing block. Started merely 12 years back, aggressive expansion was in its DNA. It was almost as if the entire team of Jubilant were a bunch of toughened gun slinging westerners. There was Samarth “Sam” Prakash- their CEO, a young man with a taste for hard negotiation, close competition and fast expansion. 8 years back, Sam broke the back of a local suppliers cartel by acquiring a Bangladeshi supplier. At that time, the local suppliers scoffed at the move. But by the time they  scrambled to prevent the damage, their demise was cast in stone. Since then local suppliers stopped holding their prices high and Sam got cheap inventory.

Till now the Bentham & Martin had 450 stores in Eastern India. Jubilant Retail has 390 stores. 8 years back it was an expansion machine, but today it has settled down into an uneasy truce with Bentham & Martin. However, the low number of stores shouldn’t be judged as a giving up by Jubilant Retail. Bentham& Mills and Jubilant Retail were competing store for store in the most profitable circles of Eastern India. If anything, it didn’t compete in the sub 450 circles (Circles are divided as per the average billing rate of an individual customer unit- even a family shopping together will be counted as one customer. 450 implied here the average billing rate. It stretched to maximum 980 evident in metros to a minimum of 300 evident in tier 3 and 4 cities).

For Vik the problem was two fold. Western India was slowing down and to maintain the profitability he had to milk the Eastern cow. But milking the eastern cow was not easy. Any move to break the uneasy truce in East will lead to a bitter tooth and nail fight for market share.

It was a dicey situation indeed.

What in the hell is brewing here mate, muttered Vik to himself. If he opens new stores, Sam will mirror each move with his own store in every new circle. Result, driving real estate prices preventing further expansion, a decline in footfalls. This will kill the profits for both the firms and the net profitability per customer for both will fall to Rs 15/cust. However if Jubilant Retail decides to cut the prices- Bentham & Martin will be left holding the bag – Jubilant’s per customer profitability will outstrip Bentham’s.


For Vik Monga- the situation was worse than it looked. Any move to cut prices can create a converse situation where Jubilant responds by building new stores ( which will create the exact converse replica of the case where Bentham expands physically and Jubilant cuts prices, with the exact concomitant result) or matches the price cut by a price cut. In the later case, a price cut when matched by a price cut will give them both a near about the same net profitability per customer. Only, the  profitability difference between the two will shrink from 8% to 4%.

But for Vik – it was both a blessing and a curse that most probably Sam was also doing the same calculation. The blessing it was because in such a wafer thin margin business a dumb competition can kill the entire sector. Curse because dumb competition also meant easy lunch for the smart. And for Vik the balance was completely skewed. While he was given four choices – two of them were just decoys. And he understood it very well. If he played the game for a long time where each of them chose differing choices (i.e. not mirroring each other) then the resultant payoff for each player will  be sum of probability weighted profits ( in this case 50% of 30 + 50% of 20 = 25).

Bloody decoys. 


Vikram Monga looked up at the clock. It was 5.30 pm already. His  8 year old grandson had a school play today and he wont be missing it. He took off his jacket off from the chair, swooped his arms in. But his mind was still racing, he was thinking about the situation and mess both of the companies are staring into.

It’s a cesspool of blood, mud and filth. All the choices lead to either one of them.

If you are the advisor to Vikram Monga, what advise would you give him ?

How growth kills economy of scale: A case study

A newspaper article describing the losing sheen of tablets is on ET today. The premise is simple:

“The India tablet story is losing steam. After a 56% surge in 2013, tablet shipment fell nearly 28% sequentially in the first three months of 2014. 

As many as four million units were sold last year, compared with 2.66 million in 2012. But in the January-March quarter of 2014, only 0.78 million tablets were shipped, down more than 17% from a year earlier “

The growth of tablets industry has been phenomenal in the last few years. In 2012, a Hindu BusinessLine article showed a year on year growth of 673%. The growth this year has slowed down to 76%.
A 76% growth in any sector will draw deep cheers but so much has been the historical growth for this sector that a high two digit growth rate is a dampener.

But deep inside this development is a conundrum. The only difference between two manufacturers of electronic hardware is economics of production (or economy of scale). A smaller entity can’t make as much profit as a bigger manufacturer makes purely because the fixed cost per unit is lower.

In absence of any switching costs for the end consumer, price becomes the only difference. For laptops, mobile phones and tablets it is evident. There is just no switching cost for the end consumer. As a result, price or rather features per unit of price become the driving idea behind any transaction.

But with Google’s Android push in the last 5-6 years, almost entire onus of features have moved from hardware to software. There is just no difference between two devices! As a result, there is no differentiation and there is no switching cost for the consumer.

In absence of such demand side advantages, economics of scale becomes harder to protect. But harder still when there is growth involved.

As mentioned elsewhere in this blog, growth expands the pie and everyone becomes a competitor and no one the incumbent. This cocktail effectively makes the least efficient competitors quit the game. ET corroborates this:

“From a peak of 68 players competing in the market in the second quarter of 2013, the number has fallen to 30 now.”

A 50% reduction in the players implies a huge churn. This lack of stability is another indicator that there is no moat really.
However a small silver lining adopted is the new focus adopted by the companies. The manufacturers are going niche rather than going global. Increasingly making their tablets industry centric, they are re focussing on software. As a result they have a chance of creating durable moats, as professionals will (or should be made to ) spend considerable training time to master the different features of a software.
Reminds me of Bloomberg terminals.